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ABSTRACT. Reducing carbon emissions through avoided deforestation and forest degradation and enhancement of carbon stocks
(REDD+) is key to mitigating global climate change. The aim of REDD+ social safeguards is to ensure that REDD+ does not harm,
and actually benefits, local people. To be eligible for results-based compensation through REDD+, countries should develop national-
level safeguard information systems to monitor and report on the impacts of REDD+. Although safeguards represent a key step for
promoting social responsibility in REDD+, they are challenging to operationalize and monitor. We analyzed the impacts of different
types of REDD+ interventions (incentives vs. disincentives) on key safeguard-relevant indicators, i.e., tenure security, participation,
and subjective well-being, as well as on reported forest clearing. We used household-level data collected in Brazil, Peru, Cameroon,
Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam from approximately 4000 households in 130 villages at two points in time (2010-2012 and 2013-2014).
Our findings highlight a decrease in perceived tenure security and overall perceived well-being over time for households exposed to
disincentives alone, with the addition of incentives helping to alleviate negative effects on well-being. In Brazil, although disincentives
were associated with reduced reported forest clearing by smallholders, they were the intervention that most negatively affected perceived
well-being, highlighting a clear trade-off  between carbon and noncarbon benefits. Globally, although households exposed to REDD+
interventions were generally aware of local REDD+ initiatives, meaningful participation in initiative design and implementation lagged
behind. Our analysis contributes to a relatively small literature that seeks to operationalize REDD+ social safeguards empirically and
to evaluate the impacts of REDD+ interventions on local people and forests.
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INTRODUCTION
With the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, the world agreed that
mitigating the negative effects of climate change must include
tropical forests. Deforestation and forest degradation produce
70% of tropical land-use emissions and account for 10-11% of
net global greenhouse gas emissions (Le Quéré et al. 2015). Forests
also serve as important carbon sinks, absorbing 4-6 gigatons (gt)
of carbon from the atmosphere annually (IPCC 2014). Many
tropical countries refer to reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation and enhancing carbon stocks (REDD+)
in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) toward
keeping global temperature rise below 2.0/1.5 °C. Furthermore,
over 300 subnational REDD+ initiatives have been implemented
across the tropics (Simonet et al. 2015), enabling early action and
enhancing learning through implementation on the ground (Sills
et al. 2014). As part of the results-based financing aspect of
REDD+, countries have put into place rigorous measurement,
reporting, and verification (MRV) systems for assessing forest
losses and gains relative to baseline or reference scenarios. In
parallel, there is growing attention to establishing systems for
monitoring the social impacts of REDD+. This new attention to
social impacts is in sharp contrast to evaluations of early forest
carbon projects, such as those implemented through the clean
development mechanism, which gave very limited attention to
whether projects were benefiting or harming local people (Caplow
et al. 2011).  
REDD+ safeguards, articulated by the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), are an
important mechanism for providing guidance on monitoring and
evaluating the potential social and environmental (or noncarbon)
impacts of REDD+. The original concept of safeguards comes
from multilateral development banks aiming to avoid, mitigate,
or minimize adverse impacts from investment and development
activities (World Bank 2005). The UNFCCC Cancun Agreement
stipulates seven safeguards (Decision 1/CP.16) that encourage
REDD+ programs to: (a) complement national forest programs
and international conventions and agreements; (b) maintain
transparent governance; (c) respect the knowledge and rights of
indigenous people and local communities; (d) obtain effective
participation in REDD+ design and implementation; (e) promote
forest conservation and other environmental and social
cobenefits; (f) address risks of reversals; and (g) reduce leakage
(UNFCCC 2011). To be eligible for results-based finance through
the UNFCCC, REDD+ countries should develop national-level
safeguard information systems to monitor and regularly report
on the social and environmental impacts of REDD+ (UNFCCC
2014). Furthermore, some multi- and bilateral donors and third-
party certifiers require additional standards for demonstrating
high social and environmental performance, such as the World
Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Fund and the Climate
Community and Biodiversity Alliance.  
REDD+ performance can be achieved in different ways.
Implementers of subnational REDD+ initiatives are applying
intervention portfolios that combine strategies characterized as
disincentives and incentives to achieve better protection and
enhancement of forests (Sills et al. 2014). Indeed many of these
initiatives reflect conventional integrated conservation and
development approaches with conditional incentives playing a
lesser role than originally envisaged (Sunderlin et al. 2015).
Restrictions (“sticks”) focus on strengthening compliance with
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Fig. 1. Study sites (map credit: Astrid Bos).
existing laws or norms, and include regulatory, monitoring, or
enforcement activities that restrict access to or conversion of
forests. Incentives (“carrots”) include nonconditional or
occasionally conditional livelihood enhancements (e.g., direct
payments, subsidized or free agricultural inputs, technical
assistance, etc.) to compensate landholders for expected losses, or
even make them better off, for land management actions that favor
REDD+ objectives. Prior to implementation of disincentives and
incentives, enabling measures, such as land tenure clarification
and environmental education, help establish the conditions for
responsible land stewardship, e.g., in terms of adequate
assignments of rights and information.  
Our aim is to understand the impacts of different types of
interventions designed to protect or enhance forests (i.e.,
incentives, disincentives, and a mixed portfolio of incentives and
disincentives) on rural households in six tropical countries, using
indicators of REDD+ social safeguards (c)-(e), which address
rights, participation, and social benefits. We focus on these three
safeguards because they are most relevant to local well-being and
are those that are most appropriately evaluated, at least in part,
at the household-level.  
Specifically we ask the following questions:  
1. What was the effect of different types of forest interventions
on perceived tenure security, local awareness of and
participation in REDD+, and perceived well-being? 
2. How effective are the different types of interventions in
reducing forest clearing? 
The literature on rights, participation, and social cobenefits in
REDD+ allowed us to operationalize the social safeguard
indicators used in this analysis. For REDD+ safeguard (c),
although respect for local knowledge and rights is quite broad,
much of the REDD+ literature has converged on the importance
of tenure security, or clear and enforceable local rights to forests
and carbon (e.g., Corbera et al. 2011, Larson et al. 2013, Sunderlin
et al. 2014). For safeguard (d), full and effective participation
requires high levels of engagement by local stakeholders
throughout REDD+ design and implementation. It begins with
access to information, which is reflected in the requirement of
free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) as target communities
choose whether to participate in REDD+. It also links to broader
multilevel governance issues with mechanisms needed to promote
local engagement in higher-level REDD+ processes (Agrawal et
al. 2011). For safeguard (e), enhancement of other social benefits
can be conceptualized as improving human well-being, assuring
equitable benefit sharing, and increasing the adaptive capacity of
local people (Lawlor 2013). Although narrow economic
indicators (e.g., income) are often used to measure social benefits,
subjective measures of human well-being are also needed
(Woodhouse et al. 2015). Importantly, there are interconnections
among these social dimensions; for instance, secure tenure can be
considered the basis for improving local livelihoods and
increasing local adaptive capacity (Chhatre et al. 2012), while
greater local participation in REDD+ decision making may result
in more equitable benefit sharing and long term support of the
activities (Cromberg et al. 2014). In this context, it is critical to
understand the impacts of different kinds of interventions,
especially those that could inhibit local forest use, on household
tenure security and well-being, and assess if  people targeted by
interventions are aware of and involved in local initiatives.
Understanding local perceptions of the effects of interventions
can provide a deeper understanding of the impacts of REDD+,
and inform ways to design interventions to maximize benefits and
minimize risks.  
Our analysis contributes to a relatively small literature that seeks
to operationalize REDD+ social safeguards empirically (e.g.,
Jagger and Rana 2017) and to evaluate the impact of forest
interventions on local people (e.g., Sunderlin et al. 2017). Our
focus on household-level impacts is novel, as is our use of data
from a global comparative dataset. Our study design and its
comparative nature provide considerable internal and external
validity.
METHODS
Study sites and sampling
We use data gathered by the Center for International Forestry
Research’s (CIFOR) Global Comparative Study on REDD+
(http://www.cifor.org/gcs/) at 17 subnational REDD+ sites in
Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam (Fig.
1). Sites were selected in early 2010 from among the population
of subnational initiatives in the six countries that had defined site
boundaries and intervention areas, but had not yet applied
REDD+ interventions, allowing us to collect baseline data. Most
of the initiatives were implemented by nongovernmental
organizations, with the others led by for-profit companies or
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Table 1. Household-level data used to operationalize REDD+ social safeguards (c)-(e).
 
Safeguard Indicators Data used
(c) Rights Tenure security Reported security of total household landholdings in phase 1 and
phase 2 (1 = secure, 0 = insecure)
(d) Participation Knowledge of REDD+ initiative Household awareness of local REDD+ initiative in phase 2 (1 =
yes, 0 = no)
Participation in REDD+ initiative Household involvement in design and/or implementation of local
REDD+ initiative in phase 2 (1 = yes, 0 = no)
(e) Social cobenefits Subjective well-being Overall well-being of household in phase 1 and phase 2 compared
with two years prior (1 = better off  now, 2 = about the same,
worse off  now)
Perceived effect of specific interventions on household well-being
in phase 2 (1 = very negative, 2 = negative, 3 = no effect, 4 =
positive, 5 = very positive)
subnational governments. The majority are dependent on public
or philanthropic funding, and as of 2014, only 2 of the 17 had
sold carbon credits (Sills et al. 2014). All initiatives were active
during the period of our study, except for the Cat Tien project,
which was discontinued in 2012 (Huynh 2014).  
At these sites, we selected study villages and households based on
a uniform sampling strategy, with 4 intervention (REDD+) and
4 control (non-REDD+) villages selected per site, and
approximately 30 households randomly sampled per village. At
six sites, there was some deviation from the target of four
intervention and four control villages because of specific site-level
constraints (e.g., at one site, there were only two villages in the
REDD+ project area). More detail on the study sites, study
design, and data collection is provided in Sills et al. (2014) and
Sunderlin et al. (2016).  
Baseline data (phase 1) were collected between 2010 and 2012. A
second round of data (phase 2) was collected in 2013/2014. Both
rounds of data collection involved semistructured interviews with
village groups (N = 130 in phase 1; N = 129 in phase 2) and a
separate set of focus group interviews with women from each
village (N = 130 in phase 1; N = 129 in phase 2). Household-level
interviews were conducted in both research phases (N = 4184 in
phase 1; N = 3989 in phase 2).  
During phase 2 of fieldwork, we collected data on all forest
interventions that had been applied at the household level,
including all interventions aimed at directly or indirectly
influencing the way stakeholders use and manage local forests,
whether applied by implementers of the REDD+ initiatives or
not. To compile a full list of forest interventions for each study
village, we used information from interviews with REDD+
implementers and village key informants, and revised the list
based on information gathered in the village-level focus groups at
the onset of fieldwork. In the household surveys, we then asked
if  the household had been involved in each intervention, and if
so, their evaluation of its effect on their well-being. We categorized
forest interventions into two main categories: (1) disincentives
(sticks) that focus on restricting access to or conversion of forests
and (2) incentives (carrots) that motivate forest-conserving
actions through livelihood enhancements. Although we recognize
the importance of enabling measures (e.g., tenure clarification
and environmental education interventions) in promoting social
safeguards, the low application of this type of intervention at our
study sites limited our ability to include it as a separate category
in the analyses.  
Households in both REDD+ intervention and control villages
were categorized according to whether they had received
disincentives only, incentives only, a mixed portfolio of incentives
and disincentives, or no interventions at all. We chose to categorize
households in this way given that some key forest interventions
(e.g. environmental fines) were not only applied at REDD+ sites,
but rather more broadly across the landscape with clear
implications for social safeguards. Also, households in REDD+
intervention villages were not treated homogeneously (i.e., there
was within-village variation in the types of interventions applied),
and many were involved in no interventions at all.
Data analysis
Assessing effects of forest interventions
We present household-level data on changes in tenure security,
safeguard (c), knowledge of and participation in local REDD+
initiatives, safeguard (d), and subjective well-being, safeguard (e;
Table 1). For the analysis of change in tenure security, we
examined a change in reported tenure security of total household
landholdings (forest and agricultural lands) between phase 1 and
phase 2 among households exposed to different intervention
types. In the household survey, tenure security was defined as the
confidence that the household would continue to be able to use
its current landholdings for at least the next 25 years.  
For the analysis of knowledge and participation, we assessed
awareness of, and participation in, the local REDD+ initiative in
phase 2 among households at REDD+ sites that were exposed to
different intervention types, including no interventions at all.
Awareness was measured by asking respondents if  they had heard
of the local REDD+ initiative. Participation was measured by
asking respondents if  anyone in their household had been
involved in any aspect of initiative design and/or implementation.  
For the analysis of subjective well-being, we focused on two
aspects of well-being in phase 2. The first focused on reported
change in overall household well-being when compared with two
years prior, and the second on the evaluation of the effect of
specific interventions on household well-being. We used the broad
Merriam-Webster (2010) definition of well-being, as “the state of
being happy, healthy and prosperous” to avoid imposing a rigid
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definition on respondents’ own conceptions of well-being
(Sunderlin et al. 2016). For the first analysis, we looked at the
proportion of households exposed to the different intervention
types, including no interventions at all, that reported being better
off  and then at the proportion of those that reported being worse
off in phases 1 and 2. For the second analysis, we calculated an
average score from the Likert responses for the perceived effect
of each intervention on household well-being in phase 2 (1 = very
negative; 2 = negative; 3 = no effect/both negative and positive;
4 = positive; 5 = very positive). When households were exposed
to more than one intervention, we calculated a well-being change
score for each by averaging the effect of different interventions
first among those of the same type (e.g., all incentives) and then
among different types of interventions (e.g., incentives and
disincentives). Households that did not receive any interventions
were excluded from this analysis because they did not report the
effects of any interventions on their well-being.  
We also present household-level data on reported forest clearing.
For this analysis, we examined the change in reported forest
clearing between phase 1 and phase 2 by households that were
exposed to different intervention types, including no interventions
at all. In both phases of the household survey, we asked
respondents how much forest (ha) they had cleared in the two
years prior to the survey. Because these values were self-reported,
not objectively measured through remote sensing data, and
smallholders may face sanctions for forest clearing, we
hypothesize that some underreporting may have occurred.
Statistical models
For knowledge, participation and the effects of specific
interventions on well-being, we were limited to using phase 2 data
because those responses relied on households’ assessment of
specific interventions, which were only solicited in phase 2. For
these analyses, the outcome of interest is the relative, pairwise
difference between intervention types. We thus applied a Tukey-
style test for multiple comparison of parametric models, using
the glht function in the R multcomp package (Hothorn et al. 2008,
R Core Team 2015), to rank intervention types according to the
relative effect size. For tenure security, overall well-being (not
linked to specific interventions), and forest clearing, we used the
full set of data from phase 1 and phase 2, which enabled us to
examine changes over time for households exposed to different
intervention types.  
We performed all analyses using mixed effects models in R
package lme4 (Bates et. al 2015). In all models, we determined if
changes in the social safeguard and forest clearing outcomes were
affected by exposure to the different intervention types (i.e.,
disincentives only, incentives only, both disincentives and
incentives, and no interventions at all). Models including both
phase 1 and phase 2 data were fitted with phase, intervention type,
and their interaction as fixed effects. We accounted for the
hierarchical structure of the data, including village, study site, and
country (the latter only for pooled sample models) as nested
random effects. Models with a binary (yes/no) dependent variable,
such as knowledge and participation, were fitted as logistic
regressions. All models with a Gaussian error term were tested
for overdispersion and fitted with an individual-level random
effect as needed (Harrison 2014).
RESULTS
Forest intervention types
First, we present findings on the distribution of interventions by
percent of households targeted by at least one intervention (N =
2007). At the global level (pooled results), incentives were the
most common intervention applied: 40% alone and 27% as part
of a mixed portfolio of incentives and disincentives (Fig. 2);
disincentives accounted for the remaining 33%. However, we
observed considerable heterogeneity across countries. In Peru and
Brazil, nearly half  of targeted households were subjected to some
sort of disincentive designed to restrict access to and/or
conversion of forests. In contrast, in Indonesia, most households
received only incentives, and at the REDD+ site studied in
Vietnam only incentives were applied. At the Vietnam site,
disincentives were intended to be part of the REDD+
implementation plan, but never happened because of the
premature end of the project in 2012. Between 23 and 43% of
targeted households in Peru, Brazil, Tanzania, and Cameroon
received an intervention mix consisting of both disincentives and
incentives. Of all households surveyed in phase 2 (N = 3989),
about half  received no interventions at all.
Fig. 2. Percent of targeted households in phase 2 that received
incentives, disincentives, or both.
There were important differences between countries within the
categories of disincentives and incentives. For disincentives, all
interventions that restricted forest access and/or conversion were
included in this category. Specific activities included determining
the boundaries of set-aside forests, enforcing forest protection
laws and regulations, and community monitoring (Table 2). At
most sites in Brazil, disincentives primarily consisted of
environmental fines and police patrols (including helicopter fly-
overs) by federal or state government agencies to dissuade
smallholders from clearing and burning forests. Although these
command-and-control measures were not implemented as part
of the REDD+ initiatives, except in the case of Acre in which the
state government led the program, they were key interventions
aimed to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation at the sites. At one site in Peru, disincentives included
governmental land-use restrictions in Brazil nut concessions,
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Table 2. Examples of interventions in disincentive and incentive categories.
 
Intervention subcategories Examples of interventions in sample
Disincentives
Restrictions on forest access and/or conversion
Brazil: Monitoring of deforestation and forest fires by national and state
environmental agencies through helicopter flyovers, patrols, and fines.
Cameroon: Restrictions on local forest clearing and bush burning; conservation
and monitoring activities in the buffer area of a national park.
Indonesia: Community participatory mapping to clarify village boundaries and
establish village land-use plans; community-led forest patrols.
Peru: Land-use restrictions in Brazil nut concessions based on approved
management plans; forest monitoring and surveillance in indigenous territories
by REDD+ implementer, regional indigenous organization, and national park
service.
Tanzania: Restrictions on forest use through implementation of village forest
management plans.
Incentives
Nonconditional livelihood enhancements
Sustainable agriculture (i.e., alternatives to traditional
swidden practices)
Brazil: Technical assistance and mechanization of crop fields to stop use of fire
in agriculture.
Vietnam: Support for cocoa and cashew production.
Sustainable animal production Brazil: Provision of technical assistance and inputs to raise chickens.
Indonesia: Support for establishment of fish ponds, provision of floating net
cages, and fish hatchlings.
Sustainable energy Tanzania: Provision of alternative sources of energy, such as solar panels and
construction of improved cook stoves.
Sustainable timber management Peru: Promotion of sustainable forest management through capacity building,
construction of a timber processing plant, and reforestation with economically
important timber species.
Sustainable nontimber forest product management Peru: Support for production, certification, and commercialization of Brazil
nuts.
Forest restoration Brazil: Restoration of degraded lands with agroforestry systems through
provision of seedlings and technical assistance.
Indonesia: Training and piloting community-based peatland rehabilitation,
which includes establishing community groups to commercially produce
seedlings for planting in rehabilitation sites.
Conditional livelihood enhancements
Direct cash payments Brazil: Small bonus payment for smallholder farmers engaged in more
sustainable agriculture.
Cameroon: Small bonus payment for REDD+ project participants that report
illegal forest activity.
Tanzania: Trial payments for REDD+ project participants based on reduced
deforestation.
Funds for sustainable production and infrastructure Indonesia: Funding of activities related to rubber cultivation and chicken
raising if  villages comply with annual goals of deforestation reduction agreed
upon with REDD+ project implementer.
Cameroon: Payments to local forest management committees to fund village
infrastructure and microprojects, based on meeting sustainable land-use targets
agreed upon with REDD+ project implementer.
which were not performed by the REDD+ implementing
organization but considered an integral part of the initiative
strategy. At a second site in Peru, the REDD+ implementer,
regional indigenous federation, and national park service were
assisting with various forest monitoring and surveillance
interventions in indigenous communities toward controlling
illegal logging. In Cameroon, as part of one REDD+ project,
there were restrictions on villagers’ forest clearing and bush
burning activities. At another, villagers’ land use in the buffer area
of a newly created national part was monitored as part of the
REDD+ initiative. In Tanzania, restrictions on villagers through
the implementation of forest management and land-use plans, or
the creation of village groups to conserve and restore “ngitili”
(enclosed) forests that restrict livestock grazing during the wet
season, were integral to several REDD+ initiative strategies. In
Indonesia, disincentives primarily consisted of community forest
patrols and land-use planning that included restrictions on access
to and conversion of forests.  
Although disincentives were applied by a wider variety of actors
(government agencies, REDD+ implementers, regional
indigenous organizations), incentives were largely applied by the
implementers of REDD+ initiatives and organizations directly
affiliated with the initiative. The higher number of households
targeted by incentives (Fig. 2) reflects the diversity of customized
nonconditional and conditional livelihood enhancements applied
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in different contexts (Table 2). Nonconditional livelihood
enhancements ranged from technical assistance and inputs for
more sustainable forestry and agriculture practices to alternative
energy sources (e.g., improved cook stoves). Conditional
livelihood enhancements included direct cash payments to
individuals or villages based on well-defined conservation
behaviors, along with funds to support more sustainable land-use
practices if  villagers complied with forest conservation targets.
Although nonconditional livelihood enhancements were applied
across all 17 sites, conditional livelihood enhancements were
applied with limited scope at only 7.
Tenure security
Results of the tenure security outcomes of different intervention
types are shown in Table 3. At the global level, there was a decrease
in tenure security over time for households exposed to
disincentives alone, with the same trend observed in Brazil and
Peru. In Indonesia and Tanzania, there was a clear increase in
tenure security over time, which was independent of the
application of any forest interventions. In Indonesia, this result
could be explained by the fact that landholdings managed and
used by smallholders were considered relatively secure, with
village authorities increasingly playing a strong role in negotiating
any conflicting land claims with both internal and external
claimants (Sunderlin, de Sassi, Sills, et al., unpublished
manuscript). In Tanzania, strong customary rights to community
forests, which have grown over time, are likely the reason for very
low levels of tenure insecurity (Sunderlin, de Sassi, Sills, et al.,
unpublished manuscript). Conversely, at the Vietnam site, tenure
insecurity increased over time, independent of the limited
application of interventions there. This result may have been
associated with delays in the government’s forestland allocation
program for issuing smallholder land certificates, which was
beyond the scope of the REDD+ initiative.  
Additionally, there was participant distribution bias; people
targeted for both incentives and disincentives reported higher
tenure insecurity in phase 1, but the trajectory of change over
time was no different than that of the other groups (i.e., no
significant change). This bias was seen in Brazil and Indonesia,
with tenure insecurity decreasing over time in households that
were exposed to both incentives and disincentives (although not
significantly). In Brazil, the bias could be explained by the fact
that several REDD+ implementers targeted areas of high
additionality (i.e., high forest cover under heavy threat) that also
often corresponded to areas of low tenure security (Duchelle et
al. 2014; Sunderlin, de Sassi, Sills, et al., unpublished manuscript).
Local knowledge of and participation in REDD+ initiatives
In phase 2, nearly 80% of households at REDD+ sites were aware
of the local REDD+ initiative. However, household participation
in initiatives was much lower. Less than 50% of households
participated in any aspect of initiative design or implementation.
Participation generally meant attending meetings about the local
REDD+ initiative, but not participating actively in decisions
related to what and how interventions would be applied.  
Results of the knowledge and participation outcomes of different
intervention types are shown in Table 4. At the global level, and
in each country with the exception of Brazil, the group that
received no interventions in phase 2 had the lowest level of
Table 3. Average percent of household total landholding (ha)
considered insecure by the household in both phase 1 and phase
2.
 
Country Intervention
type
Phase 1 Phase 2
N mean %
insecure (SD)
N mean %
insecure (SD)
Global all 3219 0.17 (0.36) 3654 0.17 (0.37)
none 1472 0.13 (0.32) 1647 0.11 (0.3)
incentives 726 0.17 (0.36) 796 0.13 (0.32)
disincentives 546 0.21 (0.4) 685 0.32 (0.46)*
both 475 0.23 (0.42)* 526 0.22 (0.41)
Brazil
all 845 0.24 (0.42) 1022 0.28 (0.45)
none 153 0.25 (0.43) 193 0.28 (0.45)
incentives 220 0.3 (0.45) 231 0.23 (0.42)
disincentives 305 0.18 (0.38) 412 0.3 (0.46)*
both 167 0.32 (0.47)* 186 0.26 (0.44)
Peru
all 420 0.21 (0.40) 492 0.29 (0.44)
none 89 0.04 (0.19) 103 0.03 (0.16)
incentives 76 0 (0) 89 0.02 (0.12)
disincentives 144 0.36 (0.46) 172 0.5 (0.48)*
both 111 0.32 (0.46) 128 0.43 (0.48)
Cameroon
all 406 0.07 (0.25) 448 0.08 (0.25)
none 109 0.09 (0.26) 121 0.1 (0.28)
incentives 138 0.09 (0.26) 152 0.11 (0.3)
disincentives 56 0.05 (0.22) 59 0.07 (0.23)
both 103 0.06 (0.23) 116 0.02 (0.13)
Tanzania
all 343 0.06 (0.23) 370 0.0 (0.05)*
none 221 0.08 (0.27) 244 0 (0.06)
incentives 49 0.02 (0.14) 52 0 (0)
disincentives 20 0.03 (0.12) 21 0 (0)
both 53 0 (0) 53 0 (0)
Indonesia
all 989 0.17 (0.36) 1107 0.11 (0.29)*
none 726 0.15 (0.33) 813 0.1 (0.28)
incentives 201 0.18 (0.38) 230 0.1 (0.28)
disincentives 21 0.17 (0.36) 21 0.13 (0.28)
both 41 0.38 (0.48)* 43 0.26 (0.41)
Vietnam
all 216 0.12 (0.26) 215 0.20 (0.38)*
none 174 0.11 (0.24) 173 0.21 (0.39)
incentives 42 0.15 (0.32) 42 0.17 (0.33)
*Significant difference in the regression models at p < 0.05. In the phase
1 column, this symbol shows a significant difference at baseline relative
to the group that received no interventions, i.e., a selection effect. In the
phase 2 column, this symbol shows a significant difference in the group
(table line) over time.
awareness of and involvement in the local REDD+ initiative. In
Brazil, households subjected to disincentives were the least aware
of the REDD+ initiative and also participated the least.
Importantly, the main disincentives applied at the Brazilian sites
were national-level regulatory measures (e.g., environmental
fines) that fell outside the purview of REDD+ implementers.
Households at REDD+ sites could easily be subjected to these
disincentives, which had been broadly applied across the Brazilian
Amazon, without having participated directly in the local
REDD+ initiative. Conversely, in Peru, households that
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Table 4. Percent of households at REDD+ sites in phase 2 reporting knowledge of and participation in local REDD+ initiatives,
expressed as % of “yes” answers (standard deviation).
 
Knowledge Participation
Country Intervention type N Yes % (SD) Rank† N Yes % (SD) Rank†
Global none 769 55.5 (49.7) 3 427 24.36 (43.0) 3
incentives 602 89.9 (30.2) 1 541 57.86 (49.4) 2
disincentives 318 80.8 (39.4) 2 257 33.46 (47.3) 2
both 429 94.9 (22.1) 1 407 73.96 (43.9) 1
Brazil
none 117 81.2 (39.2) 2 95 7.37 (26.3) 3
incentives 126 97.6 (15.3) 1 123 61.79 (48.8) 1
disincentives 209 73.2 (44.3) 3 153 13.73 (34.5) 2
both 153 89.5 (30.7) 1 137 57.66 (49.5) 1
Peru
none 54 68.5 (46.8) 3 37 62.16 (49.1) 1
incentives 51 86.3 (34.7) 3 44 63.64 (48.7) 1
disincentives 77 97.4 (16.1) 1 75 57.33 (49.8) 1
both 67 92.5 (26.4) 2 62 75.81 (43.1) 1
Cameroon
none 24 70.8 (46.4) 2 17 64.71 (49.2) 2
incentives 110 95.5 (20.9) 1 105 50.48 (50.2) 2
disincentives 7 100.0 (0) 1 7 85.71 (37.7) x
both 113 100.0 (0) 1 113 82.30 (38.3) 1
Tanzania
none 96 64.6 (48.0) 2 62 33.87 (47.7) 2
incentives 56 100.0 (0) 1 56 73.21 (44.7) 1
disincentives 1 100.0 (0) 1 1 100.00 (0) x
both 53 100.0 (0) 1 53 100.00 (0) 1
Indonesia
none 383 50.7 (50.1) 2 194 20.62 (40.6) 2
incentives 231 86.6 (34.1) 1 200 56.00 (49.7) 1
disincentives 24 87.5 (33.8) 1 21 71.43 (46.3) 1
both 43 97.7 (15.2) 1 42 69.05 (46.8) 1
Vietnam
none 95 23.2 (42.4) 2 22 9.09 (29.4) 1
incentives 28 46.4 (50.8) 1 13 23.08 (43.8) 1
†Rank shows the statistical difference between pairwise intervention types. Rank constitutes significant differences (p < 0.05) with 1 depicting the
highest and 3 the lowest percentage of households aware of and participating in local REDD+ initiatives. Rank marked with an “x” indicates an
insufficient sample size to obtain meaningful results.
experienced disincentives had the highest awareness of the
initiative, meaning that this type of intervention was central to
the local REDD+ strategy. For instance, at one site in the Peruvian
Amazon, the REDD+ implementing organization involved
community members in forest monitoring activities designed to
curb illegal logging. At sites in Indonesia, Cameroon, and
Tanzania, households exposed to (almost) any type of
intervention were generally well aware of the local REDD+
initiative but had participated less in its design and
implementation. At the Vietnam site, given the premature ending
of the initiative, we observed low levels of knowledge and
participation overall. However there were still higher percentages
for those targeted by interventions (in this case, incentives only)
when compared with those who were not involved.
Well-being
Results of the overall well-being outcomes are shown in Table 5
with country level results in Appendix 1. At the global level, we
found a positive correlation with well-being for all intervention
types (incentives, disincentives, both) at baseline, indicating that
participating households were generally on a more positive
trajectory of well-being than nonparticipating households. In
phase 2, however, among households subject to disincentives,
there was a decrease in the number of households reporting to be
better off, along with an increase in the number reporting to be
worse off. However, there was no change in the households
receiving both disincentives and incentives, meaning that the
general worsening of well-being due to disincentives was
alleviated by the addition of incentives. At the country level
(Appendix 1, Table A1.1), other patterns were detected. At sites
in Indonesia, households targeted by incentives were worse off  at
baseline, and their perceptions of well-being improved
significantly from phase 1 to phase 2. In Peru, those targeted for
disincentives (both with incentives and alone) were at two ends
of the well-being spectrum: those who were the best off  or the
worst off  in phase 1 with no significant changes over time in either
group. Finally, in Tanzania, households targeted for disincentives
reported being less worse off  over time. This result could be
explained by activities in this intervention category that restricted
access to forests by external claimants, thus strengthening local
land rights and increasing subjective well-being.  
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Table 5. Changes in overall subjective well-being over time
 
A) Better off  (yes/no) B) Worse off  (yes/no)
Country Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2Intervention
type
N mean (SD) N mean (SD) N mean (SD) N mean (SD)
Global none 1706 0.32 (0.46) 1901 0.34 (0.47) 1706 0.28 (0.45) 1901 0.27 (0.44)
incentives 774 0.43 (0.5)* 841 0.43 (0.49) 774 0.28 (0.45) 841 0.24 (0.43)
disincentives 553 0.52 (0.5)* 697 0.47 (0.5)* 553 0.2 (0.4)* 697 0.23 (0.42)*
both 478 0.48 (0.5)* 529 0.48 (0.5) 478 0.23 (0.42)* 529 0.23 (0.42)
*Significant differences in the regression models at p<0.05. In the phase 1 column, this symbol indicates a significant difference in the first phase of the
research (i.e. baseline) relative to the control group. In the phase 2 column, this symbol shows a significant difference within the group (table line) over
time.
Results of perceived effects of specific types of interventions on
household well-being provide further insights (Table 6). At the
global level, incentives were considered to have had the most
positive effect on well-being (i.e., higher Likert scores) followed
by a combination of disincentives and incentives, and
disincentives alone, with highly significant differences among all
groups. These results were mirrored in Brazil with the same
sequence and high significance. In contrast, in Peru there was no
difference between disincentives alone and in combination with
incentives in terms of positive well-being scores, meaning that
specific disincentives were not necessarily considered negative.
This interpretation could also apply to findings from Indonesia.
Although in the previous analysis, there was an increase in general
well-being associated with incentives in Indonesia, this analysis
showed no difference between intervention types. These results
are not necessarily at odds, but simply demonstrate that the
general assessment of specific disincentives was just as positive
as the assessment of incentives; again suggesting disincentives
pose a relatively minor burden to smallholders and possibly some
benefits. In Tanzania, disincentives alone were considered
significantly more positive than the two other categories. Again,
this is likely because of the nature of those restrictions, which
were implemented by villagers and might be considered a way to
help exclude external claimants from locally important forests. In
Cameroon, incentives were viewed significantly more positively
than the other two categories. Vietnam was not included in this
analysis as no disincentives were applied there.
Reported forest clearing
Results of the forest clearing outcomes of different intervention
packages are shown in Figure 3. At the global level, the
distribution of disincentives was skewed toward households with
higher reported forest clearing at baseline. Furthermore, these
households reported clearing significantly less forest in phase 2
than households receiving other types of interventions (or no
interventions at all). At the country level, these patterns held true
in Brazil and Peru, but with a significant reduction in forest
clearing among households with higher forest clearing at baseline
observed in Brazil only. In all other countries, the distribution of
disincentives was not correlated with households’ forest clearing
at baseline. The significant reduction in reported forest clearing
in Cameroon and Tanzania was independent of intervention type.
In Indonesia, the increase in forest clearing for households
experiencing disincentives was not statistically significant at the
country level, although Figure 3 suggests that it may be the case
in a particular village or site with higher-than-average clearing.
Table 6. Household-level average (and standard deviation) of
well-being scores for the different intervention types.
 
Country Intervention
type
N Mean bundle
score (SD)
Rank†
Global incentives 799 3.64 (0.25) 1
disincentives 699 3.37 (0.2) 3
both 529 3.54 (0.17) 2
Brazil
incentives 236 3.52 (0.3) 1
disincentives 419 2.94 (0.06) 3
both 188 3.18 (0.24) 2
Cameroon
incentives 164 3.79 (0.42) 1
disincentives 61 2.99 (0.36) 2
both 117 3.56 (0.19) 2
Indonesia
incentives 253 3.54 (0.21) 1
disincentives 24 3.57 (0.36) 1
both 43 3.56 (0.15) 1
Peru
incentives 90 3.13 (0.19) 2
disincentives 173 3.37 (0.16) 1
both 128 3.32 (0.16) 1
Tanzania
incentives 56 3.9 (0.14) 2
disincentives 22 4.2 (0.05) 1
both 53 4.04 (0.09) 2
†Rank constitutes significant differences (p < 0.05) between groups, with
1 depicting the highest and 3 the lowest well-being score associated with
different intervention types. Thus, in each country, groups with
equivalent ranks are not significantly different from each other, whereas
groups with different ranks are significantly different.
DISCUSSION
Balancing intervention strategies to ensure social safeguards in
REDD+ implementation
Our results highlight how the varieties of incentives and
disincentives, which are being implemented across the tropics to
protect and enhance forests, have clear implications for local
people. Brazil’'s recent success in reducing Amazonian
deforestation has been attributed to disincentives (i.e., heavy
command-and-control measures; Assunção et al. 2012), and there
are calls for a more balanced mix of policy instruments that
include incentives for landholders to conserve forests (Nepstad et
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Fig. 3. Difference in reported forest clearing from phase 1 to
phase 2 by households targeted by different intervention types.
al. 2014). There is evidence from the Brazilian Amazon that such
policy mixes could be cost-effective and probably socially
desirable, if  designed in a balanced way. Introducing payments
for environmental services (PES) as a complement to command-
and-control measures could help balance the costs and benefits
of conservation for local landholders (Börner et al. 2015). This is
consistent with findings from a protected area in Rwanda
highlighting how PES introduced new motivations, which were
linked to perceptions of equity, for local farmers to conserve forest
(Martin et al. 2014). Implementers of early REDD+ initiatives
are experimenting with such intervention mixes, and there are
important lessons to be learned from the local impacts of the
different strategies.  
Our analysis focused on the effect of different types of
interventions on tenure security, local awareness of and
participation in REDD+, and subjective well-being, which are all
key elements of REDD+ social safeguards. We found that
disincentives more than incentives were driving the observed
patterns. There was a clear correlation between exposure to
disincentives and a general decrease in perceived well-being across
the global sample. Disincentives alone were associated with
decreased tenure security in Brazil and Peru, which could be
because there was greater effort in applying disincentives than
incentives in those two countries. Moreover, the net effect of one
powerful disincentive, such as an expensive fine, may affect local
people more than a set of smaller incentives. Indeed, as seen from
households’ evaluation of specific interventions on their well-
being, there was a clear negative effect on subjective well-being of
strictly enforced regulatory measures in Brazil. However, when
disincentives were combined with incentives, negative effects on
household well-being were alleviated, highlighting the
importance of incentives in the intervention mix. In Indonesia,
where more households were exposed to incentives, there was a
clear increase in general well-being associated with households
that had received the intervention. Interestingly, there may also
be an upside to disincentives. In Indonesia and Tanzania, specific
regulatory measures either did not affect smallholders negatively
or they possibly provided some benefits (i.e., helping to defend
lands against unwanted external users). This result makes sense
in that REDD+ implementers in Tanzania engaged local people
in applying restrictions, and several communities in Indonesia
were involved in monitoring local landholdings. These regulatory
measures were very different from the top-down command-and-
control measures observed in Brazil.
Trade-offs between carbon and noncarbon benefits, and who
decides?
There is a trade-off  between the carbon effectiveness of
disincentives and their perceived effects on tenure security and
well-being. Our research supports other empirical findings on the
effectiveness of command-and-control measures in curbing forest
clearing in Brazil (Assunção et al. 2012). In this case, it is as they
relate to smallholder farmers. In Brazil, where disincentives were
correlated with fewer hectares of forest cleared, they were also
correlated with decreased tenure security and negative effects on
household well-being. In Peru, disincentives had no bearing on
forest clearing, and concurrently there was no change in
household well-being, but were correlated with a decrease in
tenure security, possibly due to increased surveillance of local
landholdings. At sites in Indonesia and Tanzania, where
disincentives did not affect forest clearing by smallholders, they
were viewed more favorably. Because most households in our
global sample are highly dependent on agricultural income, and
by extension forest clearing, for their livelihoods (de Sassi et al.
2014), such trade-offs need to be addressed.  
There is an inherent tension between carbon and noncarbon
values in REDD+. Because the primary goal of the mechanism
is to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, the UNFCCC
strengthened noncarbon values through linking REDD+
safeguard information systems to results-based finance
(UNFCCC 2014). Although social safeguards have the potential
to empower local people in REDD+, the clear rules and guidance
that are in place for measurement, reporting, and verification of
carbon emissions do not exist for assessing the social performance
of REDD+ (Duchelle et al. 2015). Thus, REDD+ is still open to
interpretation by different actors with different interests on
acceptable level of trade-offs between carbon and noncarbon
goals (McDermott et al. 2012).  
Such disconnects are apparent between REDD+ implementers
and local people (Ravikumar et al. 2015). Implementers of the
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REDD+ initiatives in our study largely focused on small-scale
agriculture as a driver of deforestation (Sunderlin et al. 2015),
thus supporting restrictions on clearing and burning forests and
providing incentives to smallholders for more sustainable
agricultural practices. However, monetary incentives to curb
traditional swidden practices were often too small to adequately
compensate farmers for the loss of agricultural income, and
technical assistance was lacking to help them engage in new
production techniques. At a REDD+ project site in Madagascar
in which rural people were compensated for forest use restrictions
imposed by a national park, there was evidence of elite capture
as social safeguard assessors were more likely to compensate
households with greater social-political power and higher food
security due to their inability to understand the local context
(Poudyal et al. 2016). At a REDD+ project site in Mexico, the
local community’s worldview of sustainability through
entrepreneurial forest use contrasted remarkably with the project
implementer’s focus on strict conservation, highlighting the
limited ability of safeguards to benefit local people when decisions
about interventions are made without adequate local engagement
(McDermott and Ituarte-Lima 2016).  
Full and effective participation, as articulated in REDD+
safeguard (d), is one key element of such engagement. Most
implementers of the REDD+ initiatives in our sample had
engaged in or planned to engage in the free prior informed consent
(FPIC) process with local stakeholders (Jagger et al. 2014), and
a range of benefit sharing mechanisms were being tested at these
sites (Luttrell et al. 2013). That said, getting the balance of
incentives and disincentives right is key to minimizing social risks
(do no harm) and promoting social cobenefits (do good). Our
findings highlight that in Indonesia, Cameroon, and Tanzania,
there were relatively high levels of awareness of the local REDD+
initiatives among participants subjected to most intervention
types. However, in general, smallholders did not really have a say
in what types of interventions should be implemented in their
communities. Because FPIC is an important entry point to
guaranteeing local rights, broader engagement is needed for
designing interventions that can benefit both local people and
forests (Cromberg et al. 2014).
CONCLUSION
Despite broad interest in minimizing risks and maximizing
benefits for local people in REDD+, there has been minimal
empirical evaluation of the social impacts of REDD+ or
operationalization of social safeguards. This research addresses
that gap through analyzing the effects of different types of forest
interventions on key social safeguard indicators. Because the
interventions examined go beyond those solely applied by
REDD+ implementers, our findings highlight the importance of
ensuring that interventions designed to protect forests also benefit
local people. Although extra effort is needed to adequately
measure social impacts at the local level, there are clearly good
reasons to do so. Disincentives can have negative impacts on
smallholders’ rights and well-being, and possibly even more so
when they effectively decrease forest clearing, inhibiting local
livelihoods. Incentives can help alleviate the burden of
disincentives, but the right balance is needed. Local perceptions
of the social impacts of forest interventions must be prioritized
in safeguards monitoring because individual farmers and
communities across the tropics will ultimately make the collective
difference in how forests are managed. The principles outlined in
the UNFCCC REDD+ safeguards are at the heart of the
sustainable development goals, and there are clear synergies
between the urgent climate and sustainable development agendas.
Social monitoring based on robust impact evaluation methods
and grounded in local perspectives and processes, can help harness
these synergies and provide the needed evidence for sound
environmental and social policymaking in tropical forest
countries.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
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Appendix 1. Table A1.1. Changes in overall subjective well-being over time at the country level. 
 
 
Country 
Intervention 
type 
A) Better off (yes/no) B) Worse off (yes/no) 
  
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 
  
N mean (SD) N mean (SD) N mean (SD) N mean (SD) 
Global 
none 1706 0.32 (0.46) 1901 0.34 (0.47) 1706 0.28 (0.45) 1901 0.27 (0.44) 
incentives 774 0.43 (0.5)* 841 0.43 (0.49) 774 0.28 (0.45) 841 0.24 (0.43) 
disincentives 553 0.52 (0.5)* 697 0.47 (0.5)* 553 0.2 (0.4)* 697 0.23 (0.42)* 
 both 478 0.48 (0.5)* 529 0.48 (0.5) 478 0.23 (0.42)* 529 0.23 (0.42) 
          
Brazil 
none 160 0.61 (0.49) 206 0.61 (0.49) 160 0.14 (0.35) 206 0.14 (0.35) 
incentives 222 0.66 (0.48) 235 0.62 (0.49) 222 0.13 (0.33) 235 0.15 (0.36) 
disincentives 308 0.63 (0.48) 418 0.56 (0.5) 308 0.11 (0.31) 418 0.15 (0.36) 
both 169 0.6 (0.49) 188 0.61 (0.49) 169 0.14 (0.34) 188 0.12 (0.33) 
         
Peru 
none 90 0.31 (0.47) 104 0.22 (0.42) 90 0.12 (0.33) 104 0.18 (0.39) 
incentives 75 0.28 (0.45) 90 0.27 (0.44) 75 0.07 (0.25) 90 0.12 (0.33) 
disincentives 144 0.49 (0.5)* 172 0.29 (0.46) 144 0.16 (0.37)* 172 0.36 (0.48) 
both 111 0.53 (0.5)* 128 0.34 (0.48) 111 0.15 (0.36)* 128 0.28 (0.45) 
         
Cameroon 
none 116 0.3 (0.46) 132 0.32 (0.47) 116 0.45 (0.5) 132 0.44 (0.5) 
incentives 149 0.54 (0.5)* 163 0.4 (0.49)* 149 0.37 (0.48) 163 0.37 (0.49) 
disincentives 57 0.14 (0.35)* 61 0.39 (0.49)* 57 0.7 (0.46)* 61 0.31 (0.47)* 
both 102 0.42 (0.5)* 117 0.55 (0.5) 102 0.33 (0.47)* 117 0.26 (0.44) 
         
Indonesia 
none 924 0.32 (0.47) 1013 0.36 (0.48) 924 0.26 (0.44) 1013 0.21 (0.41) 
incentives 236 0.22 (0.42)* 252 0.39 (0.49)* 236 0.39 (0.49)* 252 0.24 (0.43)* 
disincentives 23 0.48 (0.51) 24 0.5 (0.51) 23 0.3 (0.47) 24 0.29 (0.46) 
both 43 0.37 (0.49) 43 0.4 (0.49) 43 0.28 (0.45) 43 0.3 (0.46) 
         
Tanzania 
none 238 0.13 (0.34) 256 0.16 (0.37) 238 0.5 (0.5) 256 0.41 (0.49) 
incentives 51 0.2 (0.4) 56 0.27 (0.45) 51 0.59 (0.5) 56 0.41 (0.5) 
disincentives 21 0.24 (0.44) 22 0.36 (0.49) 21 0.24 (0.44)* 22 0.32 (0.48) 
both 53 0.19 (0.39) 53 0.3 (0.46) 53 0.47 (0.5) 53 0.34 (0.48) 
Vietnam 
         
none 178 0.3 (0.46) 190 0.29 (0.46) 178 0.22 (0.42) 190 0.41 (0.49) 
incentives 41 0.54 (0.5)* 45 0.24 (0.43) 41 0.12 (0.33) 45 0.31 (0.47) 
*Significant differences in the regression models at p<0.05. In the phase 1 column, this symbol indicates 
a significant difference in the first phase of the research (i.e. baseline) relative to the control group. In the 
phase 2 column, this symbol shows a significant difference within the group (table line) over time. 
 
